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Abstract. Building on the current theory of industrial concentration, we analyze the 
relation between market size and product differentiation, and show how product 
differentiation impacts market share turbulence. Our basic results highlight that in markets 
where vertical product differentiation dominates, firms will have an incentive to escalate 
investment in advertising and/or R&D as market size increases. Such (firm-specific) 
investments will make competitive advantage more sustainable as the firm is less imitable. 
This will not be the case if the market is primarily characterized by homogeneous product 
or horizontal product differentiation. Our predictions are tested using an original EU dataset 
for the period 1987-1997. Our results strongly support our predictions – the degree of 
market share turbulence increases with market size. However, this relation is weakened by 
competitive investment in advertising and R&D. 
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INTRODUCTION 
ur major objective is to advance the 
understanding of market share 
turbulence, drawing from Industrial 
Organization (IO) and the strategy literature by 
considering both the industry environment and 
the role of firm-specific resources and 
capabilities. Traditionally, the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm 
hypothesized that there exist observable 
structural market characteristics (e.g., the 
number of sellers, the degree of product 
differentiation) that determine firm conduct 
(e.g., price, R&D, advertising) that in turn 
determine performance (e.g., profitability). 
Thus, product differentiation was considered to 
be one of the main, largely exogenous, 
components of industry structure. Moreover, the 
S-C-P paradigm highlighted the importance of 
barriers to entry, arguing that if entry barriers 
are high, then market power is more easily 
exploited, and firms will earn higher profits. The 
main sources of entry barriers were identified as 
the degree of economies of scale, product 
differentiation, and absolute cost advantages.1 
The S-C-P approach is basically a short-run 
static one, where conduct is sidelined, and the 
focus is mainly on the relationship between 
structure and performance.2 However, it remains 
one of the most influential paradigms within the 
strategy literature (Ferrer, Smith and Grimm, 
1999). 
In IO, recent game-theoretic advances have 
displaced the S-C-P approach, showing that 
industry structure is not merely an exogenous 
determinant of conduct and performance, but is 
instead endogenously determined by the 
competitive process. In other words, history 
matters. If sunk costs (irreversible 
commitments) exist, the potential entrant must 
always consider how the incumbent will respond 
                                                                    
 
 
1  Note Demsetz (1973) argues that industries could be 
concentrated because firms have heterogeneous 
capabilities, with the lowest-cost firms obtaining the 
highest market shares. Thus, high concentration, and high 
profits (as a by-product) may reflect superior efficiency, 
rather than the exploitation of market power. 
2  Indeed, Schmalensee (1989) provides a survey of the 
hundreds of structure-profitability studies that were 
undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s. 
to entry.3 Although the development of game 
theory has allowed large advances to be made, it 
has also been criticized for yielding extremely 
sensitive predictions that are hard to test 
empirically, mainly due to the large number of 
unobservables (Porter, 1991; Sutton, 1991). As 
such, although these types of models could 
potentially be hugely important in the strategic 
management field, for example, in analyzing 
inter-firm rivalry, their actual impact to date has 
been rather limited (Ghemawat, 1998). Thus, 
given the major weakness of new empirical IO, 
which is that firm conduct and performance in a 
particular market can only be explained using 
some chosen game-theoretic model, so results 
are neither readily generalizable nor robust, it is 
perhaps understandable that such models are not 
currently widely used in strategy, particularly 
assuming the goal of informing managerial 
practice and strategic choices. However, Sutton 
(1991, 1998) is able to generate a few key 
rigorous, robust and testable predictions from 
the theory of strategic behaviour, emphasizing 
the strategic choices of sunk costs in a simple 
and highly general framework. The general 
empirical results obtained then usefully 
complement and extend ultra-micro studies: "the 
experiences of individual industries can be 
mapped into special cases of a general 
theoretical model whose robust results drive the 
cross-industry regularities" (Sutton, 1991). 
In this paper, we complement the Sutton 
approach with the resource-based view of the 
firm which essentially argues that firms’ 
resources, rather than the product market they 
compete in, are more important in terms of 
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991). Although intuitively appealing, it 
has been argued that much work remains to be 
done in formalizing the resource-based view, 
particularly with respect to how to create 
competitive advantage, and interactions over 
time between firms’ resources and the external 
environment (Priem and Butler, 2001). This 
paper hopes to shed light on the latter issue. 
Thus, our central question is how firms’ 
heterogeneous ownership of resources and 
                                                                    
3  E.g. the incentives for entry deterrence depend 
(sensitively) on the correlation between pre-entry actions 
(e.g. fixed capital investment (Dixit, 1980) or advertising 
(Schmalensee, 1983)) and competition in the post-entry 
game. 
O 
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capabilities lead them to compete over the set of 
strategic opportunities across industries. A 
complete characterization of the set is, of 
course, not possible. However, what is possible, 
and moreover, of academic interest, is the ability 
to identify robust regularities that will tend to 
yield competitive advantage. Thus, we can more 
easily assess the strategic choices that make 
firms advantaged or disadvantaged within the 
same industry, where sunk commitments in a 
dynamic or uncertain environment influence 
future outcomes. For example, Ghemawat 
(1991) argues that irrevocable investments can 
lead to persistent performance differences 
among firms. Thomas (1995) shows how sunk 
investments in advertising affect the order of 
entry into new product markets in several 
consumer goods industries. 
In Section 2, the impact of endogenizing 
product differentiation and market structure is 
discussed. We show that in markets where 
vertical product differentiation dominates, firms 
will have an incentive to invest in advertising 
and/or R&D to enhance consumers’ willingness 
to pay as market size increases. Such 
investments will tend to make competitive 
advantage more sustainable as the firm is less 
imitable. This will not be the case if the market 
is primarily characterized by horizontal product 
differentiation. In Section 3, our unique dataset 
on firms’ market shares over time in 
manufacturing industries in Europe is discussed. 
Descriptive statistics are provided. Section 4 
presents the econometric methodology, and 
empirical application. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As the new theory of concentration is by now 
relatively well known, this section (briefly) 
summarizes Sutton (1991, 1998). Manufacturing 
industries can be split into two types, which 
Schmalensee (1992) labeled as Type 1 and Type 
2. Type 1 industries are characterized by 
homogeneous and horizontally differentiated 
products. Type 2 industries by vertically 
differentiated products. We focus on the relation 
between market structure and market size. 
1.1 Market Structure and Market Size: Type 1 
Industries 
Homogeneous Product Industries: in such 
industries, the only source of fixed costs is 
production economies of scale. The basic 
intuition of the model is that as market size 
increases, industry profits increase, and given 
free entry, new firms will enter until the profits 
of the last entrant just cover the exogenous 
overhead costs, paid on entry. The more 
sensitive is price competition to new entry, the 
bigger will be the gap between pre-entry and 
post-entry profits. This implies that if price 
competition becomes tougher, fewer firms will 
come into the market. Overall, however, the net 
effect of an increase in market size must be a 
rise in firm numbers and thus, reduced 
concentration. This minimum level of 
concentration is termed the lower bound to 
concentration.4 This story highlights that for a 
given market size, if fixed costs are large 
relative to market size, only a few firms are 
sustainable. Thus, the technology of production 
is an important determinant of industry 
structure. Moreover, if firms have different costs 
due to heterogeneous resources and capabilities, 
the intra-marginal firm who has the lowest 
marginal costs will have an advantage and earn 
higher profits. For a given market size, ceteris 
paribus, the market will be more concentrated 
than in the symmetric case.5 
Horizontally Differentiated Industries: the 
implications of horizontal and vertical 
differentiation with respect to market structure 
and sustainability of competitive advantage are 
                                                                    
4  Note the increase in the number of firms is less than 
proportionate. This is because price-cost (profit) margins 
fall as the number of firms increases, so each firm has to 
increase its level of output to cover its fixed costs which 
means fewer firms can profitably exist.  
5  Röller and Sinclair-Desgagné (1996) attempt to take into 
account both IO and strategy explanations for why 
persistent differences in conduct and performance 
amongst firms in the same industry are observed (Hatten 
and Schendel, 1977; Mueller, 1986). Using a Cournot 
model, they show that firms’ capabilities would diverge 
only if there existed some heterogeneity in their initial 
capabilities, or an appropriate combination of 
organizational inertia (defined as the cost incurred to 
update capabilities) and market conditions. Thus, 
technological, market-based, historical and organizational 
factors should all be correlated with persistent 
profitability differences. 
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very different, so should be carefully examined. 
If we consider the representative consumer 
approach, à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the 
results show that assuming free entry, constant 
marginal costs with a fixed cost of production, 
and a CES utility function (which implies that 
products are treated symmetrically), price and 
output are independent of market size. Thus, as 
market size increases, there are now more 
profitable opportunities and new entry will 
occur until profits are driven to zero. However, 
the number of firms will increase 
proportionately with market size, as the 
elasticity of substitution is constant.6 
In locational models, à la Hotelling, on the 
other hand, competition is localized. Shaked and 
Sutton (1987) show that as market size 
increases, and assuming the distribution of 
consumer tastes is constant, market shares can 
always be made arbitrarily small by entering 
between existing products and capturing a 
positive market share. However, if the number 
of firms increases in a particular segment, the 
existing firms now find that there is more 
competition (the elasticity of substitution has 
increased). This implies that as market size 
increases, the increase in firm numbers is less 
than proportionate. However, in both 
approaches to understanding horizontal 
differentiation, the inverse structure-size 
relationship is a general result. 
Thus, in Type 1 industries, we can construct a 
lower bound to concentration that tells us the 
lowest level of concentration we would expect 
to observe for a given market size.7 Depending 
on the strategic choices that firms make within 
specific industries as well as external factors 
                                                                    
6  As there are no perceived cross-effects by assumption, 
strategic interactions such as product positioning cannot 
be analyzed because all products are generalized 
substitutes. Intuitively, it is as if firms are assigned a 
product randomly on entry; there is no notion of 
‘neighbourhood’ relative to the other products in the 
market. 
7  In an industry characterized by horizontal differentiation, 
a range of equilibrium outcomes becomes possible. The 
same group of firms might enter all submarkets leading 
to high concentration with a few multi-product firms or, 
on the other hand, small niche firms may enter each 
submarket, yielding a more fragmented structure. 
such as government regulation, many industries 
will lie above the lower bound.8 Overall, the 
Sutton approach, although general and robust, 
cannot tell us much about what we expect to 
observe above the lower bound to concentration, 
and this is where the resource-based view of the 
firm plays a very important role. 
1.2 Market Structure and Market Size: Type 2 
Industries 
In an industry characterized by vertical product 
differentiation, every consumer has the same 
ranking of quality. Thus, if all products were 
sold at the same price, all consumers would 
choose the highest quality product (Mussa and 
Rosen, 1978; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; 
Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983, 1987). Products 
can be sold at different prices either because 
consumers have differing levels of income or 
relatively less intense preferences for quality 
(i.e., sensitivity to quality).9 
In Type 2 industries, firms not only compete 
in price but also in advertising and/or R&D to 
increase the (perceived) quality of the product. 
Intuitively, as market size increases, the 
incentive to gain market share through the 
escalation of advertising and/or R&D 
expenditure also increases. The consequent rise 
in overhead costs has a countervailing effect on 
market structure by increasing the degree of 
economies of scale. The basic notion is that 
although there appears to be room for more 
firms in a larger market, 'the escalation 
mechanism' raises fixed costs per firm, possibly 
even to such an extent that the negative 
structure-size relation breaks down (Sutton, 
1991) as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                                    
8  Also consider whether the market is in disequilibrium. In 
the short run, it may take quite a long time before firms 
merge or exit, particularly if economies of scale are large 
relative to market size, as exit will tend to be slower, the 
more sunk (industry specific) is the plant. 
9  Such an industry may be labeled a ‘natural oligopoly’. 
This differs crucially from horizontal differentiation 
where if all products were sold at the same price, every 
product would have a positive market share, i.e. 
consumers vary in their rankings of product 
characteristics. 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 14/2005 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Type 1 and Type 2 Lower Bounds to Concentration 
 
 
 
However, horizontal differentiation still has 
an important role to play, particularly if 
industries are R&D intensive. This is because, 
unlike in advertising intensive industries, where 
we can define the market such that advertising 
covers all a firm's products in that market, firms 
in an R&D intensive industry may produce 
several groups of products that are imperfect 
substitutes. These products may be imperfect 
substitutes not only in consumption, but also on 
the supply side in that they embody different 
technologies. Thus, each technology may lead to 
several marketable products, where these 
products may be close or distant substitutes for 
products associated with another technology.  
A firm can choose whether to focus on a few 
technologies, undertaking a lot of R&D per 
technology, “escalation” or whether to spread 
their R&D expenditure across a wide range of 
technologies, “proliferation”. It can be shown 
that the cheaper it is to improve product 
performance, or the closer the substitutability of 
rival technologies (and associated product 
groups), the more likely it is that the escalation 
mechanism dominates, and thus, concentration 
is expected to be higher (Sutton, 1998; 
Matraves, 1999).10 
Thus, at small market sizes, firms have little 
incentive to spend on advertising/R&D. Given 
the correlation between horizontal and vertical 
differentiation, concentration may even be lower 
in Type 2 industries than in Type 1. However, as 
market size increases, although (production) 
economies of scale relative to market size 
become negligible, escalation in advertising 
and/or R&D expenditure endogenously 
increases the returns to scale in an industry. 
Thus, initial industry conditions and the 
strategic choices that the firm makes in terms of 
advertising and/or R&D expenditure will 
determine relative success, where the focus is on 
one key variable, market size. This yields 
Hypothesis 1 (Sutton, 1991; Lyons and 
Matraves, 1996; Matraves, 1999). 
 
                                                                    
10 If products are not good substitutes for one another, then 
a firm that outspends its rivals along a particular 
technological path can only capture sales for a small 
product group. This means that the firm cannot capture 
market share from rival firms on different technological 
paths. Consequently, it does not pay to escalate R&D 
spending, and therefore, the incentive to introduce a new 
product variety, i.e., to proliferate, is stronger. 
 
C 
S 
Type 2 
Type 1 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 14/2005 
 
 
 
  
9
HYPOTHESIS 1: AN INCREASE IN MARKET SIZE IS 
ASSOCIATED WITH AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL 
OF ADVERTISING AND/OR R&D EXPENDITURE 
THAT, IN TURN, WILL TEND TO MAKE TYPE 2 
INDUSTRIES MORE CONCENTRATED THAN TYPE 1 
INDUSTRIES. 
 
1.3 Turbulence and Market Size 
What our theoretical framework has contributed 
so far is a neat way of thinking about initial 
industry conditions, and tracing out incentives 
for firm investment in variables such as 
advertising and/or R&D. Our theory allows us to 
draw a lower bound on the number of firms we 
would expect to observe in an industry, but 
remains silent on why we might expect to 
observe industries that lie above the lower 
bound, or in other words, why firms might vary 
in size. Thus, the resource-based view of the 
firm complements our existing theoretical 
framework, by helping to provide an 
explanation for why certain firms would be able 
to succeed, by matching their distinctive 
competencies to the environmental opportunities 
(Peteraf, 1993, Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). As 
Henderson and Mitchell (1997) argue, 
consensus will probably never be reached about 
whether organizational capabilities or the firm’s 
environment are more important in terms of 
sustaining competitive advantage, as both are 
fundamentally endogenous, and so we must take 
both explanations into account. This section 
considers the relation between market share 
turbulence and our key theoretical variable, 
market size. 
We define competitive advantage as a firm’s 
ability to outperform its industry, and it is 
sustainable if it persists despite efforts by the 
firm’s current rivals or indeed potential entrants 
to duplicate or neutralize the advantage. In order 
to generate sustainable competitive advantage, it 
has been argued that resources and capabilities 
should be rare, valuable, difficult to imitate, 
non-substitutable (Barney, 1991) and non-
transferable in that they cannot be easily 
purchased in resource markets (Dierckx and 
Cool, 1989). These unique resources create 
isolating mechanisms that protect the firm from 
imitation (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982), where 
such isolating mechanisms might include for 
example, property rights on scarce resources. In 
addition, managerial decisions with respect to 
resource deployment are characterized by 
uncertainty, complexity and intraorganizational 
conflicts (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Thus, 
heterogeneity across firms is maintained, where 
firms with superior resources will earn rents 
(Peteraf, 1993). Not only are resources 
heterogeneous in the resource-based view of the 
firm, but they are also sticky (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997) in that in the short run at least, 
firms are constrained by their current resources 
(Diericky and Cool, 1989).11 
Arora and Gambardella (1997) show how the 
size of the market matters with respect to firm 
competencies, where in larger markets, firms are 
more efficient. Studying engineering firms that 
supply licensing and construction services to the 
oil and petrochemical sector across Europe and 
the U.S., their results show that in the 
significantly larger U.S. market, firms 
dominated in licensing, which required more 
specific competencies. On the other hand, 
European firms, operating in much smaller 
markets, tended to be present in construction 
services where fundamental skills did not differ 
much across projects, and therefore required 
more general competencies.12 
This evidence emphasizes very nicely the 
complementarity of our theoretical approaches. 
Essentially, all these industries are R&D 
intensive industries, characterized by both 
horizontal differentiation as well as vertical 
differentiation. In larger markets, firms have an 
incentive to produce for market niches, as 
observed in the U.S. licensing segments. 
However, these engineering firms will develop 
rather more specialized competencies, because 
there is little incentive to escalate R&D 
spending, if that R&D spending is specific to 
                                                                    
11 If the competitive forces threatening sustainability are 
pervasive, profits in most industries should quickly 
converge to zero (Besanko et al., 2000). However, if 
entry barriers or barriers to imitation are high, then we 
should expect to observe some persistence in profit rates 
over time, although it is not at all clear how one should 
judge “duration of leadership”, i.e. what is the short run 
versus what is the long run? (Mueller, 1986; Sutton, 
2002). 
12 Arora and Gambardella (1997) argue that similar patterns 
can be seen in machine tools, chemicals, computers, and 
telecommunications, where market size matters more for 
product-specific competencies than generic 
competencies. 
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one product niche, and economies of scope in 
R&D are not easily obtained. On the other hand, 
in smaller markets like the various European 
markets, firms will tend to develop more general 
competencies, such as was observed in 
contracting services. This is because if any 
economies of scale in R&D can be obtained, 
then contracting services will be the segment. 
Their results highlight our argument that both 
organizational capabilities and the firm’s 
environment are crucial in terms of sustaining 
competitive advantage, and moreover the 
underlying unifying factor is market size. 
Asplund and Nocke (2005) develop a very 
interesting stochastic dynamic model of a 
monopolistically competitive industry where 
firms are heterogeneous (i.e. differ in their 
initial “efficiency levels”) and are subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks. They analyze the 
relationship between market size and entry and 
exit rates, where each firm’s efficiency is 
assumed to follow a Markov process. The 
results from their theoretical model highlight 
that entry costs are negatively related to and 
fixed production costs positively related to entry 
and exit rates. Their central prediction is that the 
level of firm turnover is increasing in market 
size, due primarily to an increase in price 
competition in larger markets. Intuitively, 
although firms sell more in larger markets, the 
increase in the number of firms puts pressure on 
margins, and so the marginal surviving firm is 
necessarily more efficient in larger markets, and 
correspondingly, the probability of failure is 
higher.13 This yields Hypothesis 2 (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1997; Asplund and Nocke, 2005). 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: THE DEGREE OF MARKET SHARE 
TURBULENCE WILL INCREASE WITH MARKET 
SIZE. 
 
However, we do not expect this relationship to 
hold across all industry types. In Type 2 
industries, we have emphasized how a larger 
market size encourages firms to invest more 
                                                                    
13 In addition, and although not looking at turbulence per 
se, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) investigate the 
effects of market size on the size distribution of 
establishments for thirteen retail trade industries in the 
U.S., and find that (for the most part), increases in market 
size are associated with increases in establishment size. 
See also Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who look at “the 
toughness of price competition” and market size. 
heavily in such quality increasing overhead 
costs. If endogenous sunk cost expenditure 
escalates, this will tend to discourage entry in 
the first stage of the game as it implies that 
competition in advertising and/or R&D is tough. 
However, this entry barrier is the outcome of the 
competitive mechanism, and as such the concept 
of the strategic versus the structural entry barrier 
needs very careful consideration. Moreover, 
vertical differentiation has a direct influence on 
barriers to imitation. Although barriers to 
imitation can also arise from legal restrictions, 
superior access to inputs or customers or 
intangible barriers such as causal ambiguity and 
social complexity, we focus on market size and 
scale economies. In a Type 2 industry, the firm 
is creating rather more intangible barriers to 
imitation than in a Type 1 industry. As market 
size grows, an incumbent has an incentive to 
advertise even more, further strengthening the 
value of its brand name or undertake R&D to 
enhance actual quality of the product. This 
endogenous escalation of advertising and/or 
R&D makes it all the more difficult for less 
established rivals or potential entrants to build 
the reputation of their brands. This yields 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: THE POSITIVE RELATION 
BETWEEN TURBULENCE AND MARKET SIZE WILL 
BE LESS PRONOUNCED IN TYPE 2 INDUSTRIES AS 
COMPARED TO TYPE 1 INDUSTRIES DUE TO 
HIGHER BARRIERS TO IMITATION. 
 
However, there are some crucial differences 
between expenditure on advertising versus R&D 
that we must discuss. First, appropriability is a 
problem in R&D intensive industries - as soon 
as one firm innovates, rivals may attempt to 
copy it, although any non-expertise of the 
imitators will slow down the diffusion rate. In 
contrast, in advertising intensive industries, the 
incentive for firms to imitate actual advertising 
campaigns is far lower.14 Second, the patent race 
                                                                    
14 Interestingly, in those consumer goods industries where 
firms compete in both advertising and R&D, if a firm 
introduces a new product, by intensively advertising the 
new product, consumers can become aware of the 
increase in product quality more quickly. This will tend 
to raise the size and speed of the payoff to R&D, and in 
turn, reduce the appropriability problem. 
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literature shows that leapfrogging plays an 
important role in R&D intensive industries, 
implying a strong positive link between market 
structure and turbulence. Caves and Porter 
(1978) look at the stability of market shares for 
the period 1963-1972, and find that product 
R&D significantly destabilizes market shares 
whereas advertising has a stabilizing effect 
(although insignificant), whatever the level of 
R&D, as advertising can be more rapidly 
adjusted to competitive changes. Overall, 
although R&D expenditure may appear ‘more 
sunk’, we might expect greater market share 
persistence in advertising intensive industries as 
brand name is harder to imitate (Thomas, 1995).  
Thus, although we expect the positive relation 
between turbulence and market size to be less 
pronounced in Type 2 industries, we might 
observe the least amount of turbulence in 
advertising intensive industries as compared to 
R&D intensive industries. 
2. MARKET SHARES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As there is no European census of production, 
we had to construct our own estimates of market 
shares. This was a huge task because for each 
industry, we had to identify the leaders, estimate 
their disaggregated production, and estimate the 
size of EU production. Thus, we conduct our 
empirical analysis with a large hand-collected 
database comprised of the 223 manufacturing 
firms that are the industry leaders in the 
European Union in 1987 and 1997.15 This 
market share matrix is designed to track, in a 
consistent manner, and using firm-level data, the 
evolution of the industrial and corporate 
organization of the European Union.16 The 
                                                                    
15 As there are 67 industries, if each firm were a leader in 
one industry only, there would be 335 firms in the 
dataset. However, as many conglomerates obtain a 
leading position in more than one industry, our total 
number of firms reduces to 223 in both years. This 
implies that each firm is on average a leader in 1.5 
industries. This dataset is the result of a collaborative 
international project financed by the European 
Commission. The main results are summarized in Davies, 
Lyons et al. (1996), Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli 
(2001), Dierx, Ilzkovitz, Sekkat (2004). See Appendix 1 
for all data measurement issues and sources. 
16 The original 1987 matrix used the NACE classification 
Rev-0, but due to changes in how industries were 
classified, the 1997 matrix was constructed using the new 
database includes the estimates of the turnovers 
of the top 5 EU leading producers in each EU 
manufacturing industry in which they operate 
for 1987 and 1997. The size of the firm’s 
operations in any given industry is the value of 
sales of goods produced in that industry - i.e. the 
firm’s output in that industry. A firm qualifies as 
a leader if it is one the five largest EU producers 
in at least one manufacturing industry. Coupled 
with published Eurostat data on aggregate 
industry turnover, we can then calculate the 5-
firm concentration ratio (CR5) for each industry 
in 1987 and in 1997. 
We obtain our measure of turbulence from 
the market shares of the EU firms that persisted 
in a top five position between 1987 and 1997. 
Turbulence may occur because new firms enter 
the top five and/or because leading firms’ 
dominance changes. The market share matrix 
thus allows us to trace changes in the identity of 
our leaders over time, as well as the changes in 
market shares of initially leading firms. In order 
to quantify turbulence, we start from the top five 
firms in 1987 that survive as industry leaders in 
1997. One measure of the persistence of the 
leading firms (Veugelers, 2004) is given by the 
cumulative market share at time t+1 (1997) of 
the old leaders at time t (1987), written as 
MSL8797, relative to the new leaders at time t+1 
(1997), written as MSL9797. Given that the 
cumulative market share of the top five leaders 
in 1997, MSL9797, is simply, the five firm 
concentration ratio, C597, we can then define 
turbulence as: TURB = 1 – (MSL8797/C597). This 
measure of turbulence yields a maximum value 
of 1 if none of the initial leaders in 1987 manage 
to survive as one of the top five firms in 1997. 
Conversely, the measure yields a minimum 
value of 0 if the same firms are in the top 5, i.e. 
when there is no new entry in the top5 in that 
industry. We can therefore think intuitively of 
TURB as the inverse of persistence in 
dominance. 
To test our hypotheses, we must also 
distinguish vertically differentiated industries 
(Type 2 industries) from those producing 
                                                                                                
NACE Rev-1 classification to ensure comparability with 
Eurostat industry data. Time comparable firm data 
became available thanks to a major reclassification of the 
industry set (from 96 NACE-Rev 0 industries to 67 
“sectors”, in an effort to match the old and the new 
classifications). See Appendix 2 for the list of industries. 
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homogeneous or horizontally differentiated 
goods (Type 1 industries). This distinction is 
operationalized using data on typical industry 
expenditures on advertising and R&D. 
Moreover, within the subset of Type 2 
industries, we further disaggregate according to 
whether the industries are advertising intensive, 
R&D intensive or both advertising and R&D 
intensive (see Davies, Lyons et al. (1996) for 
more details). Appendix 1 identifies industries 
by type. Before proceeding to the econometric 
estimates, we contextualize our results by 
reporting some simple descriptive statistics on 
concentration and turbulence by industry type. 
 
 
Table 1A: Concentration and Turbulence by Industry Type (means and standard dev.) 
 # Industries C587 C597 Turbulence 
Full Sample 67 0.253 
0.1650 
0.263 
0.160 
0.427 
0.258 
Type 1 – Homogenous Products 30 0.169 
0.126 
0.180 
0.127 
0.527 
0.214 
Type 2 – Differentiated Products 37 0.321 
0.163 
0.333 
0.150 
0.346 
0.238 
Type 2a – Advertising intensive 12 0.252 
0.116 
0.303 
0.129 
0.366 
0.198 
Type 2r – R&D intensive 17 0.361 
0.191 
0.347 
0.186 
0.351 
0.282 
Type 2ar – Adv. and R&D intensive  8 0.339 
0.139 
0.356 
0.092 
0.306 
0.211 
 
 
Table 1B: Decomposition of Mean Concentration Change 
Industry sample Means (%) 
Levels 
  
Number  
of Firms 
1987 1997 
Changes 
C5a 5.00 25.28 26.33 ∆ C + 1.05 
Survivors. 2.49 16.25 16.30 SUR + 0.05 
Exitors. 2.51 9.03 - EXT - 9.03 
Entrants. 2.51 - 10.035 ENT +10.02 
Type 1- C5b 5.00 16.89 17.69 ∆ C +0.80 
Type1 Survivors 2.03 9.40 9.65 SUR +0.25 
Type1Exitors 2.97 7.49 - EXT -7.49 
Type1Entrants 2.97 - 8.04 ENT +8.04 
Type 2- C5c 5.00 32.07 33.33 ∆ C +1.25 
Type 2 Survivors 2.86 21.79 21.69 SUR -0.10 
Type 2 Exitors 2.14 10.28 - EXT -10.28 
Type 2 Entrants 2.14 - 11.63 ENT +11.63 
(a) Across 67 industries; (b) Across 30 industries; (c) Across 37 industries. 
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A striking pattern is immediately apparent. 
Although typical concentration remained 
relatively stable over the decade (one percentage 
point of increase), inter-industry differences in 
changes and levels of concentration reveal 
considerable variation between industry types. 
Moving down columns 2 and 3 in Table 1A, we 
find that EU concentration is much higher in 
Type 2 than in Type 1 industries, a result 
consistent with the standard results on the 
determinants of concentration (e.g., Lyons and 
Matraves, 1996; Lyons, Matraves and Moffatt, 
2001). Moreover, R&D (Type 2R) is more 
strongly associated with high concentration than 
is advertising (Type 2A). This pattern holds over 
time, but with a tendency to converge. 
Concentration has risen quickly where 
advertising is more important, but has slightly 
declined where R&D is the primary source of 
differentiation. 
When we turn to our measure of turbulence, 
we again observe marked differences across our 
industry types. Type 1 industries exhibit on 
average much higher turbulence than Type 2 
industries, i.e. more of the old leaders have lost 
position since 1987 relative to the new leading 
firms in 1997. Within Type 2 industries, there is 
some evidence that advertising-intensive 
industries are more turbulent, on average, than 
R&D intensive industries. On the other hand, 
persistence of leadership is highest in type 2AR 
industries, where firms have two endogenous 
fixed costs, advertising and R&D, with which to 
compete. 
In Table 1B, we examine how survivors, 
exitors and entrants contribute to the change in 
mean concentration across all industries and 
industry types. Our results show that the average 
market share of surviving industry leaders is 
stable (around 16% in both 1987 and 1997), 
where the (small) one percentage point increase 
in concentration can all be attributed to new 
entries. When we separate out our industries by 
type, we notice that the market share of 
surviving leaders in Type 2 industries is, on 
average, more than twice that of their Type 1 
counterparts. Although this difference obviously 
depends on Type 2 industries being significantly 
more concentrated than Type 1 initially, observe 
that the average market share of Type 2 leaders 
is about twice the market share of exitors and/or 
entrants. On the other hand, the market share of 
exitors and/or entrants within Type 1 industries 
is only slightly smaller than the market share of 
survivors. Overall, and consistent with our 
findings in Table 1A, it appears that Type 1 
industries can be characterized by a more 
turbulent environment, with industry leaders 
constantly under attack. Conversely, in Type 2 
industries, the surviving leaders show a 
tendency to be much larger than their rivals, and 
hence possibly more persistently dominant. This 
pattern is reflected not only in the dynamics of 
market shares of survivors and exitors/entrants, 
but also in the average number of firms 
surviving as leaders: 2.86 in Type 2 industries as 
opposed to 2.03 within Type 1. 
3. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
To test Hypothesis 1, we use a linear function 
relating a logistic transform of concentration and 
the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of 
industry size relative to economies of scale as 
the measure of effective market size (see Lyons, 
Matraves and Moffatt, 2001). Thus, 
concentration is measured as CEi = ln(C5i/[1-
C5i]) where C5i is the 5-firm concentration ratio 
for industry i at the EU level. Market size is 
measured as SEi = 1/[ln(MESi/ESIZEi], where 
MESi is an engineering estimate of the output 
required to achieve minimum efficient scale in 
industry i, and ESIZEi is the total output of the 
EU. We define four dummy variables: d1i = 1 if 
industry i is of Type 1, and zero otherwise; d2Ai 
= 1 if industry i is of Type 2A, and zero 
otherwise; d2Ri = 1 if industry i is of Type 2R, 
and zero otherwise; and d2ARi = 1 if industry i is 
of Type 2AR, and zero otherwise. Since the 
fundamental concentration-size relationship is 
expected to differ according to industry type, we 
operationalize our model by writing the equation 
to be estimated as:  
CEi =  β1d1i +β2d2Ai +β3d2Ri +β4d2ARi 
+β5(d1iSEi)+β6(d2Ai SEi)+β7(d2Ri 
SEi)+β8(d2ARi SEi)+u1i                  (H1) 
 
 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 14/2005 
14  
 
Table 2: Concentration and Market size by Industry Type 
Dependent Variable: Concentration (1997) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
-3.358 - - Constant (-10.457) - - 
- -4.163 -4.163 
TYPE 1 - (-13.488) (-13.488) 
- -2.119 - 
TYPE 2 - (-6.023) - 
- - -1.560 
TYPE2A - - (-2.210) 
- - -2.498 
TYPE2R - - (-4.211) 
- - -1.526 
TYPE2AR - - (-3.512) 
-11.474 - - 
MARKET SIZE (-6.762) - - 
- -14.655 -14.655 
MARKET SIZE (T1) - (-7.943) (-7.943) 
- -6.581 - 
MARKET SIZE (T2) - (-4.007) - 
- - -3.594 
MARKET SIZE (T2A) - - (-0.887) 
- - -8.391 
MARKET SIZE (T2R) - - (-3.037) 
- - -3.988 
MARKET SIZE (T2AR)   (-2.434) 
N. Observ. 67 67 67 
Adj. R2 0.484 0.605 0.588 
Notes: T-statistics in round brackets. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
 
 
 
If we are willing to assume that the ranking of 
lower bounds will be reflected in averages, then 
our predictions are as follows: β1 < β2, β3, β4 
(i.e., Type 1 industries have a lower limit 
concentration as market size approaches 
infinity); and β5 < 0, β6, β7, β8 (i.e., Type 1 
industries have a steeper slope).17 
                                                                    
17 Note H1 relates to the lower bound to concentration. 
Sutton (1991) and Robinson and Chiang (1996) fit exact 
The results as presented in Table 2 offer 
                                                                                                
lower bounds to their data, whereas Lyons and Matraves 
(1996) fit a stochastic lower bound. In practice, this latter 
technique has almost no effect on the slopes but does 
substantially shift down the intercept, which is what we 
would expect given that the slope coefficients are 
consistent but inefficient, and only the intercept terms are 
biased. Thus, there is little statistical harm in fitting 
curves through the middle of the data, particularly if the 
errors are approximately normal, and as long as only 
slope coefficients are under scrutiny. 
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strong support for Hypothesis 1. While the 
results in column (1) confirm the negative 
relationship between concentration and size, our 
findings in column (2) show that the limiting 
level of concentration increases from Type 1 to 
Type 2 and, more importantly, that as market 
size increases, Type 2 industries do not tend to 
converge to a fragmented structure. Even 
without making any adjustment to convert our 
best fit line to a lower bound, the coefficient of -
4.16 suggests that EU concentration approaches 
just 1.5% as market size increases without limit 
in Type 1 industries. When we break up Type 2 
industries according to advertising and/or R&D 
intensity in column (3), we find that the limiting 
level of concentration, as market size becomes 
very large, increases from Type 1 to Type 2A to 
Type 2R, with Type 2AR industries being 
significantly different from Type 1 industries.18 
Furthermore, the slope coefficients are smaller 
in Type 2 industries, even becoming 
insignificant in Type 2a industries. This 
evidence confirms that advertising and R&D 
expenditures are active competitive weapons 
(firm specific choices) and not exogenous, and 
is totally consistent with existing empirical work 
(Sutton (1991), Robinson and Chiang (1996), 
Lyons and Matraves (1996), Lyons, Matraves 
and Moffatt (2001)). If advertising and R&D 
were exogenous sunk costs, than the lower 
bound would be shifted upwards but the slope 
effects would not be present.  
To test Hypothesis 2, we again employ a 
simple linear function relating turbulence, 
TURB = 1 - MSL8797/C597 and market size SEi = 
1/[ln(MESi/ESIZEi]. Thus, we operationalize 
our model by estimating the following equation, 
where we predict that β2 > 0: 
 
TURBEi = β1+ β2 SEi + ui               (H2) 
 
Since the fundamental relationship between 
turbulence and market size is expected to differ 
                                                                    
18 This further break up implies that few observations are 
available for Type 2 sub-samples (see Table 1), which 
suggests some caution in the interpretation of the results.  
according to industry type, we specify our 
equation to test Hypothesis 3 below, where d1i = 
1 if industry i is of Type 1 and d2i = 1 if industry 
i is of Type 2:  
TURBEi = β1d1i +β2d2i + β3(d1i SEi)+β4(d2i SEi) +u1i     (H3) 
 
We predict that the slope in Type 1 industries 
will be larger (i.e. a higher degree of turbulence) 
than the slope in Type 2 industries. Finally, and 
in line with our discussion (see section 2.3) of 
the various Type 2 industry subsets, we run an 
additional regression to see if turbulence is more 
pronounced in R&D intensive industries (Type 
2R) than in advertising intensive (Type 2A) 
industries. Note although our expectations on 
the Type 2 industry subsets are not clear cut, our 
expectation that Type 1 industries are the most 
turbulent of all is. Thus, our last column in 
Table 3 reports our results from estimating the 
following equation, where we include four 
intercepts and four slope coefficients for all 
industry types: 
 
 
TURBEi =  β1d1i +β2d2Ai +β3d2Ri +β4d2ARi 
+β5(d1iSEi)+β6(d2Ai SEi)+β7(d2Ri SEi) 
+β8(d2ARi SEi)+u1i 
 
Table 3 presents our results. Hypothesis 2, 
which predicts that turbulence increases with 
market size, is supported by the results in 
column 1. The coefficient on market size is 
positive and significant. Moreover, the results in 
column 2 provide strong support for Hypothesis 
3. We do find that the positive relationship 
between turbulence and market size is less 
pronounced in Type 2 industries as compared to 
Type 1 industries. The slope coefficient for 
Type 1 industries is positive and significant 
whereas the slope coefficient in Type 2 
industries is insignificantly negative (i.e. it is not 
significantly different from zero). This result is 
consistent with the view that in vertically 
differentiated industries, the endogenous 
escalation of advertising and/or R&D 
expenditures allows the firm to create intangible 
barriers to imitation.  
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Table 3: Turbulence and Market Size by Industry Type 
Dependent Variable: Turbulence 
 TURB: 1 - MSL8797/C597 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.591 - - 
 (6.276) - - 
TYPE 1 - 0.732 0.732 
 - (6.467) (6.467) 
TYPE 2 - 0.319 - 
 - (2.407) - 
TYPE2A - - 0.457 
 - - (3.307) 
TYPE2R - - 0.369 
 - - (1.820) 
TYPE2AR - - -0.078 
 - - (-0.297) 
MARKET SIZE  0.887 - - 
 (1.945) - - 
MARKET SIZE (T1) - 1.271 1.271 
 - (1.998) (1.998) 
MARKET SIZE (T2) - -0.133 - 
 - (-0.227) - 
MARKET SIZE (T2A) - - 0.492 
 - - (0.677) 
MARKET SIZE (T2R) - - 0.088 
 - - (0.111) 
MARKET SIZE (T2AR) - - -1.681 
 - - (-1.602) 
    
N. Observ. 67 67 67 
Adj. R2 0.029 0.113 0.078 
Notes: T-statistics in round brackets. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
 
Column 3 presents our results by industry 
type where we break up Type 2 industries 
according to whether they are R&D intensive 
(Type 2R), advertising intensive (Type 2A) or 
both (Type 2AR). Interestingly, although the 
turbulence-market size relationship breaks 
down, as predicted, for advertising intensive 
industries, the slope coefficients in Type 2A and 
type 2R are not significantly different. However, 
we do find that the slope in Type 2AR industries 
is negative and significant. This indicates the 
highest degree of persistence and dominance in 
industries where firms can choose whether to 
use both advertising and R&D as strategic 
competitive weapons.19 
                                                                    
 
19 We also re-estimated the results in columns 1 through 3 
using a logistic transform of TURB as the dependent 
variable. We found that the qualitative nature of our 
results did not change, confirming the ranking of the 
slopes of the turbulence-market size relationships, 
although the statistical significance of coefficients 
improved. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has focused on three key activities – 
manufacturing, marketing, and R&D – that 
underlie the competitive process in an industry, 
and their interaction with market size. We 
emphasize the importance of sunk costs, and 
more specifically, whether those sunk costs are 
exogenous or endogenous. We tested our 
theoretical implications on a unique dataset 
containing information on firms’ market shares 
over time. Our basic hypothesis is that in Type 2 
industries where vertical product differentiation 
dominates, firms will have an incentive to 
escalate investment in advertising and/or R&D 
to increase consumers’ willingness to pay as 
market size increases. Such (endogenous) 
investments will tend to make such industries 
more concentrated for a given market size than 
in industries primarily characterized by product 
homogeneity or horizontal product 
differentiation. The data strongly supported 
Hypothesis 1, in line with all existing studies. 
We then asked whether variations in market 
shares (or turbulence) increase with market size, 
a question that is currently attracting much 
academic attention. Again, the data strongly 
support Hypothesis 2. Moreover, we argued that 
endogenous investments will tend to make 
competitive advantage more sustainable as the 
firm is less imitable. This will weaken the 
predicted relation between market share 
turbulence and market size in Type 2 industries, 
as compared to Type 1 industries. Once more, 
our results are consistent with our theoretical 
predictions.  
In conclusion, we can clearly identify an 
underlying fundamental mechanism, which is 
that turbulence and market size are positively 
related. When we introduce competitive 
escalation in endogenous sunk costs, this 
weakens the relationship. There remains work to 
be done on disentangling precisely the relation 
between market share turbulence and market 
size in Type 2 industries, where firms have the 
choice of which competitive weapon to use, and 
how to use it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
EU C5: as there is no EU census of manufactures, we first had to identify candidate leaders in order 
to obtain estimates of the sizes of the largest firms in each industry. We undertook an analysis of the 
500 largest European firms, supplemented by firms from industrial directories, and the institutional 
knowledge of the multinational research team. Company accounts and other secondary sources were 
used to disaggregate each candidate firm’s operations by industry for the years 1987, 1993 and 1997. 
 
EU Industry Size: Eurostat data are available for ‘sales of products manufactured by the Kind of 
Activity Unit and revenue from industrial services rendered to others’ [Eurostat code 19(KAU)]. We 
made extensive use of the footnotes to fill numerous gaps in the data. The data were also grossed up 
to take account of production by smaller firms (which can be significant in some industries). 
 
Minimum Efficient Scale (MES): the basic source for these engineering estimates is Pratten (1987); 
as far as is possible, we refer to technological production economies only (excluding R&D, 
marketing, etc). Although Pratten’s is a comprehensive review, there are numerous gaps, some 
estimates are not representative of the 3-digit industry, and often the information is not provided as a 
sales value Sometimes, we made use of additional data on unit values from, for example, the UK 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, or case studies. Industries were placed in 11 size classes reflecting the 
‘typical’ MES which was felt to be as fine a categorisation as the data would allow. While it can be 
argued that engineering estimates overstate the extent of economies of scale that can reasonably be 
achieved in the market, our estimates do provide reasonable indicators of relative scale economies, 
which is all that is required for our purposes. 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 14/2005 
18  
Industry typology: Note that EU data on advertising and R&D are not available at the required level 
of disaggregation, so we had to rely on UK and US advertising data, and UK, Italian and US R&D 
data. This is much less of a problem than might be thought, as the data are required only to classify 
industries into those which engage in these forms of competition and those which do not (at least, to 
a significant extent). 
a) T2A: Data were obtained for the US (media advertising expense to sales) and the UK (MEAL 
advertising agency data). The UK data were expressed relative to UK apparent consumption 
(national industry size minus exports plus imports). To use both sets of available data, we 
classified the industry as T2A if the advertising to sales ratio was at least 0.7% in both countries.  
b) T2R: Data were obtained for the US, the UK and Italy. Rdsus (the US R&D/sales ratio) - some 
observations are at the 4-digit level, and were then aggregated up. Rdsuk (the UK R&D/sales 
ratio) - some observations are at the 2-digit level, these were then disaggregated to the 3-digit 
level assuming the same R&D intensity among constituent industries. Rdsit (the Italian 
R&D/sales ratio) industries were at a slightly more aggregate level than for the UK, and 
disaggregated in the same way. To use all sets of available data, and given the more aggregate 
nature of the UK and Italian data, we classified the industry as Type 2R if Rdsus>1% or 
Rdsuk>1% or Rdsit>1%, and Rdsus>0.25% and Rdsuk>0.25% and Rdsit>0.25%. Our main 
results are not sensitive to these cut-off points. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: INDUSTRIES BY TYPE 
SPES 
code 
Industry NACE rev. 0 NACE rev. 1 Type  
1 first processing of steel 221, 223 271, 273, 287 1  
2 steel tubes 222 2722 1  
3 non-ferrous metals 224 274 1  
4 clay products 241 264 1  
5 cement, lime and plaster 242 265 1  
6 concrete 243 266 1  
7 glass 247 261 1  
8 ceramics 248 262, 263 1  
9 basic chemicals 251, 256, 259 241, 242, 246 2R  
10 paint and ink 255 243 2AR  
11 pharmaceuticals 257 244 2AR  
12 soap, detergents, toiletries 258 245 2AR  
13 man-made fibers 260 247 2R  
14 casting, forging and first treatment of steel 311, 312, 313 272, 275, 284, 285, 287 1  
15 manufacture of metal products 314, 315, 316 281, 283, 286, 287, 296, 361 1  
16 manufacture of tractors and agricultural machinery 321 293 2AR  
17 manufacture of machine tools for working metals 322 294 2R  
18 manufacture of other machinery 323  to 328 291, 292, 295 2R  
19 computer and office equipment 330 300 2R  
20 insulated wires and cables 341 313 2R  
21 manufacture of electrical machinery 342, 348 311, 312 2R  
22 batteries and accumulators 343 314, 316 2R  
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23 electronic valves, tubes and other 
components 345 321 2AR 
24 television and radio transmitters 345, 344 322 2R 
25 television and radio receivers, sound or 
video recording apparatus 345 323 2AR 
23 - 26 
26 measuring, checking, testing instruments 345 332, 333 2AR 
2R
27 domestic electrical appliances 346 297 2AR  
28 lighting equipment and lamps 347 315 2R  
29 motor vehicles 351, 352 341, 342 2AR  
30 motor vehicles parts 353 343 2R  
31 Shipbuilding 361 351 1  
32  railway locomotives and stocks 362 352 2R  
33 cycles and motorcycles 363 354 2R  
34 Aerospace 364 353 2R  
35 measuring, checking and precision instruments 371 332, 333 2R  
36 medical instruments 372 331 2R  
37 optical instruments 373 334 2AR  
38 clocks and watches 374 335 2AR  
39 oils and fats 411 154 2A  
40 meat products 412 151 1  
41 dairy products 413 155 2A  
42 fruit and vegetables 414 153 2A  
43 fish products 415 152 1  
44 grain milling and manufacture of starch 416, 418 156 1  
45 Pasta 417 158 1  
46 bread and biscuits 419 158 1  
47 Sugar 420 158 1  
48 confectionary and ice cream 421 158 (except 1586, 1587) 2A  
49 animal feed 422 157 2A  
50 other foods 423 1586, 1587 2A  
51 alcohol, spirits, wine and cider 424, 425, 426 159 2A  
52 beer 427 159 2A  
53 Soft drinks 428 159 2A  
54 tobacco 429 16 2A  
55 textiles 431 to 435 , 437 to 439 171, 172, 173 1  
56 knitwear 436 176, 177 1  
57 leather 441, 442 191, 192 1  
58 footwear 451, 452 193 1  
59-60 clothing + made up textiles 453, 455 181, 182, 174, 175 1  
61 wood sawing 461 201 1  
62 wood boards 462 202 1  
63 - 64 wood manufactures 463, 464 203 1  
65 wooden furniture 467 361 1  
66 paper and pulp 471 211 1  
67 articles of paper 472 212 1  
68 publishing 473, 474 221, 222 1  
69 rubber products and tires 481, 482 251 2R  
70 plastics 483 252 1  
71 musical instruments 492 363 2A  
72 toys and sports goods 494 364, 365 2A  
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